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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STANDING TO CHALLENGE FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS
City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury
The standing doctrine, as employed by federal courts, fre-
quently operates as an effective obstacle to judicial review of alleg-
edly illegal or unauthorized administrative action.' The concept of
standing is of constitutional origin, grounded specifically in the arti-
cle III limitation of federal judicial power to "cases and controver-
sies" 2 and supplemented by court-imposed restraints on the exercise
of the power of review.3 Given the necessity of determining whether
the conflict is justiciable prior to reaching the merits of a particular
case,4 standing has evolved as one of several significant threshold
issues.- Throughout the course of the development of the 'standing
doctrine, the Supreme Court has refined the general guidelines by
which the standing of a particular plaintiff seeking to challenge the
I See, e.g., Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1977);
Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Hood River County v. United States Dep't of Labor,
532 F.2d 1236 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam). See also Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F.2d 477
(2d Cir. 1976).
' U.S. CONST. art. IT, § 2. The Supreme Court has construed the "cases and controver-
sies" limitation to require in general a real and substantial dispute which affects the legal
rights and obligations of parties having adverse interests and is susceptible to specific relief
through a conclusive judicial decree. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
240-41 (1937).
See Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947). With respect to suits
challenging the actions of administrative agencies, a self-imposed policy of restraint had been
adopted, due in large part to the judiciary's respect for the tripartite system of government.
Consequently, the federal courts have been reluctant to invade the realm of the other
branches of government by annulling legislative acts or enjoining activities of administrative
agencies. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The concept of justiciability encompasses all of the considerations which enter into the
determination whether a particular question may be adjudicated by the federal courts. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). In addition to barring claims of individuals who lack
standing, the notion of justiciability prohibits the federal courts from rendering advisory
opinions, e.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911), deciding moot cases, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1952), resolving political questions, e.g.,
Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923), and entertaining suits not ripe for
adjudication, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
1 One commentator has suggested that standing should not be treated as a threshold
issue, but rather should be viewed as a component of a plaintiff's claim for relief since its
resolution necessarily involves substantive issues such as injury, duty, and causation. See
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims
for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 426-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Albert].
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action of an administrative agency is to be ascertained.6 As a mini-
mum requirement, the plaintiff must possess "such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure. . . concrete adverse-
ness."7 In addition, a nexus between the injury allegedly suffered
and the challenged activity must be established.8 Recently, in City
of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury,9 the Second Circuit demon-
' See notes 42-50 and accompanying text infra. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 22 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION chs. 12-13
(1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE]; Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 450 (1970); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott]; Note, The Causal Nexus: What Must Be Shown
for Standing to Sue in Federal Courts, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 250 (1977); Comment, Judicial
Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MICH. L. REV. 540 (1971).
7 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). In codifying the right to obtain
judicial review of certain administrative activity, Congress has retained the standing doc-
trine's primary requirement that the plaintiff be injured in fact by the activity he is challeng-
ing. Orders of the Federal Power Commission, for example, may be challenged by persons
"aggrieved" thereby. See Federal Power Act § 313, 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1976). Similar provisions
are contained in the Federal Communications Act § 402(b)(6), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1976),
and the Securities Act of 1933 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (1976). In addition, § 10 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), provides: "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." As a statute "designed
to limit the unchecked power of federal administrative agencies by providing a minimum
standard of review in the absence of an express review provision," S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30-31 (1945), the APA would appear to permit judicial review of all agency actions
except those expressly exempted from review by other enactments. See 5 U.S.C. § 701a
(1976).
Until quite recently, there had been considerable controversy as to the import of § 10 of
the APA. Several courts had indicated that § 10 serves as a separate grant of subject matter
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d
803, 805 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967), while other courts had concluded that
the APA does not confer jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist, see, e.g., Bramblett
v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405, 407 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1105 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973); Zimmerman v. United States, 422
F.2d 326, 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). The Second Circuit had been
inconclusive on the issue. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). The Supreme Court has quite recently settled the issue in
the negative. In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Supreme Court opted for the
latter position, holding that § 10 of the APA does not provide an independent basis for the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 109. The Court noted that as a result of a 1976
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90
Stat. 2721, which eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement in suits involving fed-
eral questions brought against the United States or any of its agencies, a general jurisdictional
predicate for review of agency activity now exists. Thus, it was concluded that § 10 need not
be read as impliedly granting subject matter jurisdiction. 430 U.S. at 104-07. See generally
Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of
Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1975).
1 561 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 766 (1978), rev'g City of
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strated the difficulties inherent in determining whether there exists
a sufficient connection between the alleged injury and the chal-
lenged administrative action to support standing.10 Sitting en banc,
the Hartford court held that the city of Hartford, as well as two of
its low-income residents, lacked standing to challenge the propriety
of certain grants of federal funds" under the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974 (1974 Act).' 2 The court based its
holding upon the plaintiffs' failure to trace their alleged injury to
the claimed unauthorized conduct of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), or to establish that such injury
would be alleviated by the relief sought. 3
Title I of the 1974 Act created the Community Development
Block Grant program under which impoverished and blighted com-
munities can obtain federal funds for various physical and economic
improvements. 4 To obtain funds under this program, a unit of local
government must submit to the Secretary of HUD an application
which includes a housing assistance plan designed to "accurately
[survey] the condition of the housing stock in the community and
[assess] the housing assistance needs of lower"-income persons...
residing or expected to reside in the community."' 5 Although Title
Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
,0 561 F.2d at 1037-41, 1050-52.
" Id. at 1052.
,2 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (1976).
'3 561 F.2d at 1052.
, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (1976)
provides in part: "The primary objective of this chapter is the development of viable urban
communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding
economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income." Among the
specific objectives delineated are "the elimination of slums and blight," "the expansion and
improvement of the quantity and quality of community services," "the reduction of the
isolation of income groups, . . . and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality
of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of
lower income."
'5 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (1976) (emphasis added). This section provides:
No grant may be made pursuant to. . .this title unless an application shall
have been submitted to the Secretary in which the applicant-
(4) submits a housing assistance plan which-
(A) accurately surveys the condition of the housing stock in the com-
munity and assesses the housing assistance needs of lower-income per-
sons . . . residing in or expected to reside in the community,
(B) specifies a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling units or
persons to be assisted, including (i) the relative proportion of new, reha-
bilitated, and existing dwelling units, and (ii) the sizes and types of
housing projects and assistance best suited to the needs of lower-income
persons in the community, and
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I community development grants may not be used for housing con-
struction,"6 the housing needs detailed in the housing assistance
plan serve as the basis for the issuance of low-income housing grants
under Title II of the 1974 Act.'7
During the first year of implementation of the 1974 Act, it
became evident that the communities applying for Title I funds
were experiencing considerable difficulty in arriving at an accurate
"expected to reside" (ETR) figure." HUD resolved this problem-by
in effect waiving the required ETR computation for 1975 applica-
tions and promulgating regulations to guide the communities in
arriving at this figure in subsequent years. '9 Relying on this waiver,
the Connecticut towns of Glastonbury and West Hartford submit-
ted zero ETR figures in the housing assistance plan in their 1975
(C) indicates the general locations of proposed housing for lower-income
persons, with the objective of (i) furthering the revitalization of the com-
munity, including the restoration and rehabilitation of stable neighbor-
hoods to the maximum extent possible, (ii) promoting greater choice of
housing opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted per-
sons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons, and (iii)
assuring the availability of public facilities and services adequate to serve
proposed housing projects.
' See 24 C.F.R. § 570.201(f) (1976). The community development grants are to be used
for the installation of various public facilities, rehabilitation of deteriorated buildings and
improvements, and other projects designed to better the community. See 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)
(1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.200 & 570.201 (1976).
,1 The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1440
(1976). Section 1439(d)(1) of the Act states:
In allocating financial assistance under the provisions of law speci-
fied in . . . this section, the Secretary, so far as practicable, shall con-
sider the relative needs of different areas and communities as reflected
in data as to population, poverty, housing overcrowding, housing vacan-
cies, amount of substandard housing, or other objectively measurable
conditions, subject to such adjustments as may be necessary to assist in
carrying out activities designed to meet lower income housing needs as
described in approved housing assistance plans submitted by units of
general local government . ...
The importance of the housing assistance plan is made evident by the statutory scheme
and its legislative history. Title I allows the Secretary to dispense with almost all portions of
the grant application except the housing assistance plan requirement. See 42 U.S.C. §
5304(b)(3) (1976). The legislative history indicates that the housing assistance plan require-
ment, together with the Title II provisions allocating "housing assistance funds to communi-
ties based, in part, on the housing needs specified in these plans, will make it possible for
communities to plan unified community development and housing programs." H.R. REP. No.
93-1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974). Indeed, the housing assistance plan has been character-
ized by HUD as "one of the most significant parts of the community development application
process." 41 Fed. Reg. 2348 (1976).
" 561 F.2d at 1049.
, Id. The new regulations concerning application requirements appear at 24 C.F.R. §
570.303(c) (1976).
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applications to HUD, while East Hartford submitted a figure de-
rived from the waiting list of its public housing authority."0
Plaintiffs, the city of Hartford and two low-income individuals
residing therein, filed an action in district court against HUD and
suburban towns in the Hartford vicinity, challenging the propriety
of HUD's waiver of the ETR figure and seeking to enjoin the defen-
dant towns" from spending the Title I funds granted to them pend-
ing exact compliance with the 1974 Act.22 The defendants countered
by questioning the plaintiffs' standing to bring the action.23 The
district court concluded that Hartford and its coplaintiffs had es-
tablished that they had been "injured in fact" by HUD's waiver of
the ETR figure, and that they were within the "zone-of-interests"
sought to be protected by the 1974 Act.2 Having found that HUD
had indeed abused its discretion in approving the applications of the
defendant towns, the court granted the requested injunction.25
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed.21 On rehearing en
561 F.2d at 1037.
22 In plaintiffs' complaint, only HUD and several of its high-ranking personnel were
named as defendants. Later joined as defendants, the towns relied upon HUD to defend the
action in the district court. Id. at 1044 (Meskill, J., dissenting). After the district court
rendered its decision, HUD decided not to appeal. The defendant towns, however, repre-
sented by attorneys who had not participated in the trial of the action, chose to appeal to
the Second Circuit. Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 1033. The plaintiffs argued that the submission of zero ETR figures in the
housing assistance plans "effectively emasculated" the housing needs section of the applica-
tions. Without an accurate estimate of housing needs, the plaintiffs reasoned, the adequacy
of the towns' proposed projects could not be assessed. Thus, it was contended that the
Secretary was required to disapprove the applications under § 5304(c)(2) of Title 42, which
requires him to do so when "the activities to be undertaken are plainly inappropriate to
meeting the needs and objectives identified by the applicant [in the application for com-
munity development funds], 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(2) (1976)." 408 F. Supp. at 899.
21 Id. at 893. Certain officials of the city of Hartford had been plaintiffs in the original
action. The district court concluded that they had no legal interest in the outcome of the suit,
and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint with respect to these officials.
Id. at 895.
21 Id. at 894. Applying the two-pronged test enunciated in Association of Data Processsng
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), see text accompanying nn. 46-47 infra, the district
court found that the plaintiff city was within the "zone-of-interests" protected by the statute
in question, since the 1974 Act was designed to ameliorate the problems of urban blight, a
problem faced by Hartford. 408 F. Supp. at 894. The court went on to conclude that the city
of Hartford and its low-income residents had suffered injury as a result of the Secretary's
approval of the suburban town's grant application and thus had standing to sue. Id. at 897.
2 Id. at 907.
24 561 F.2d at 1044. Judge Oakes, writing for the panel majority, found two bases for
concluding that Hartford had been injured by HUD's allegedly unauthorized approval of the
applications. First, the court reasoned that, had the grants to the other towns been disap-
proved, the funds involved would have been reallocated to other metropolitan areas, "among
which Hartford would have had a priority position." Id. at 1037. Second, the court observed
that HUD's approval of applications without ETR figures decreased the likelihood that the
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banc,2 17 however, the district court's decision was reversed and the
complaint dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing. Judge Meskill, who authored the en banc plurality opinion, 29
reasoned that to establish standing, the plaintiffs must show that
they sustained an actual injury0 which could be traced to HUD's
allegedly unlawful acts31 and which was likely to be redressed by the
funds would be used to promote the spatial deconcentration objective. 561 F.2d at 1038-39.
Thus, Hartford, as the direct beneficiary of spatial deconcentration activities of its suburban
towns, obviously had been injured by HUD's approval of the incomplete applications. Id. at
1039.
Judge Meskill, in a dissenting opinion, concluded that the possibility of Hartford receiv-
ing reallocated funds was tenuous, since the injunctive relief sought would prevent the de-
fendants from receiving grants only if they failed to resubmit acceptable applications. Id. at
1045-46 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Addressing the majority's second basis for finding that
Hartford was injured, i.e., that the exclusion of ETR figures retarded the achievement of the
spatial deconcentration objective in the area, Judge Meskill contended that such an interest
could not serve as a basis for standing. He noted that since such an assertion "is nothing more
than an attempt to vindicate a general interest in the social and economic well-being of the
citizenry," it is not of the genre of proprietary interests which a city may seek to protect by
challenging government activity. Id. at 1047 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge
Meskill reasoned that since the injury allegedly sustained by the low-income plaintiffs, inade-
quate housing facilities, existed prior to the challenged action, these plaintiffs could be
granted standing only upon a showing that the problem had been aggravated by HUD's
conduct. Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded, therefore, that HUD's waiver
did not produce any negative effects, but merely failed to produce expected positive effects.
Id. at 1047-48 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
561 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1052.
Joining Judge Meskill in the plurality opinion were Judges Mansfield, Mulligan, Tim-
bers and Van Graafeiland. Chief Judge Kaufman concurred in a separate opinion. Judge
Oakes authored a dissenting opinion in which Judges Smith, Feinberg, and Gurfein joined.
561 F.2d at 1051 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973)). The Court
in SCRAP found that the plaintiffs, an environmental group composed of law students, had
standing to challenge an ICC approved surcharge on railroad rates, since the students alleged
a specific and perceptible injury flowing from the surcharge. SCRAP's contention, which the
Court did recognize as somewhat attenuated, was that the surcharge would discourage use
of recyclable materials and increase the consumption of natural resources, thereby impairing
the use of forests and streams by the group's members. Id. at 688-89. See generally 40
BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1973). Professor Davis has noted that the Court reached an "all-time
high in. . . liberality on the subject of standing" in SCRAP. Davis, supra note 6, at 489. In
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), however, the Court denied the plaintiff standing
to challenge a grant by the United States Forest Service of a permit to survey and explore
Mineral King Valley, a national park located in California, as a potential site for a ski facility.
The Court found that the plaintiff failed to allege specifically that its members would incur
injury as a result of the challenged action. Id. at 738.
31 561 F.2d at 1050 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.
(MHDC), 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). In Arlington Heights, the MHDC, a nonprofit housing devel-
opment corporation, unsuccessfully applied for a zoning variance from the village of Arlington
Heights in order to construct a low-and moderate-income housing project therein. Recogniz-
ing that several other obstacles would have to be overcome before the project could be
completed, the Court nonetheless ruled that MHDC had shown an "injury [which was]
indeed fairly traceable" to the village's action. Id. at 261.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1976 TERM
remedy sought.2 To meet this standard, the plaintiffs contended
that the waiver of the ETR requirement, coupled with the submis-
sion and approval of housing assistance plans containing zero or
inaccurate ETR figures, rendered it less likely that they would bene-
fit from the 1974 Act.3 The Second Circuit dismissed this argument,
finding that the plaintiffs' injury was at best only theoretically re-
lated to the waiver of the ETR requirement. Pointing out that all
of the Title II funds available for low-income housing subsidies had
been exhausted, the plurality concluded that the lack of accurate
ETR figures in the housing assistance plans was not likely to have
had an effect upon plaintiffs' receipt of Title II monies.35 In addition,
Judge Meskill stated that it had not been shown, beyond the level
of speculation, that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs
would alleviate their alleged injury.3
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes observed that the
1974 Act was designed to ameliorate the housing situation in central
cities such as Hartford. 7 Consequently, Hartford possesses a
"'statutory right of entitlement' . . . to cooperation from its sub-
urbs . . . with regard to the deconcentration of lower-income per-
sons and the elimination of slums and blight." 8 Standing to sue,
561 F.2d at 1050 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
1 561 F.2d at 1050.
3 Id. at 1051. The court noted that, to be granted standing, "'[a] plaintiff must
[prove] that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency
action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's
action.'" Id. (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973)).
561 F.2d at 1051.
:" Id. As to the contention that the plaintiffs would benefit from the reallocation provi-
sions of Title I if the grant applications were disapproved, see note 26 supra, Judge Meskill
found this indirect benefit inadequate to support standing:
The relief sought and obtained by the plaintiffs left the defendants two choices:
they could revise their figures and receive their grants, or they could refuse to
comply and forfeit their grants. Inasmuch as the first alternative would produce no
benefit for plaintiffs, it is immaterial whether they might benefit from the second
-at least absent a "substantial probability" that the second alternative will in
fact be chosen . . . .Here, there was not the slightest showing that any of the
defendant towns would choose to forfeit their grants rather than modify their appli-
cations.
561 F.2d at 1051 (citations and footnote omitted).
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Judge Kaufman indicated his view that the
evaluation of standing should focus upon whether there exists a "substantial likelihood that
the [plaintiffs] will benefit personally from the [remedy] they seek." Id. at 1052 (Kaufman,
C.J., concurring). Following the reasoning of the plurality, the Chief Judge concluded that
since no additional Title II funds were available, none of the Hartford plaintiffs could benefit
from the relief sought. Id. (Kaufman, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1056 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
561 F.2d at 1057 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
1978]
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Judge Oakes concluded, arose from the "alleged deprivation of such
a right."39 Thus, the dissent found that Hartford and its low-income
residents would benefit, if successful, from the suit to compel HUD
and the suburban towns to comply with the requirements of the
1974 Act, since compliance was essential to achieving spatial decon-
centration.0 Furthermore, even if no additional funds were forth-
coming, Judge Oakes noted that the presence of accurate ETR
figures in housing assistance plans might lead to a rechanneling
of available grants to those areas having the greatest need for
housing."
The Second Circuit's en banc decision in Hartford seems in
accord with recent holdings of the Supreme Court restricting stand-
ing to challenge federal agency action." This current trend toward
narrow treatment of standing issues 3 apparently marks the end of
an era in which administrative action became more susceptible to
11 Id. (Oakes, J., dissenting).
40 Id. (Oakes, J., dissenting). See note 26 supra.
1 561 F.2d at 1057 n.4 (Oakes, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that upward revision
of the ETR figures would probably affect the "location and types of lower-income housing"
which could be constructed with Title II monies. Id. (Oakes, J., dissenting). Such a redistri-
bution would presumably direct funds to those areas in the greatest need of assistance. As to
Hartford's potential for receipt of funds, Judge Oakes merely stated that at the time suit was
initiated, there was a probability that some town would choose not to revise its original
application and thereby forfeit its grant to the benefit of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1058 (Oakes,
J., dissenting).
12 See notes 49-50 and accompanying text infra.
41 Professor Davis has pointed out that all of the recent standing cases before the Su-
preme Court have been decided by a divided Court. Davis, supra note 6, at 507. The dissent-
ing justices have been quick to criticize the current majority's overly technical and unswerv-
ing position. For instance, Justice Douglas, dissenting in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975),
argued that the technical barriers imposed by the majority would impair the courts' tradi-
tional function of dispensing justice. Id. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
offered what he believed to be the true explanation of the majority's denial of standing to
the Warth plaintiff in his dissenting opinion:
I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to adjudicate the complex and difficult legal
questions involved in determining the constitutionality of practices which assert-
edly limit residence in a particular municipality to those who are white and rela-
tively well off, and I also understand that the merits of this case could involve grave
sociological and political ramifications. But courts cannot refuse to hear a case on
the merits merely because they would prefer not to ....
Id. at 520 (emphasis added) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 66 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 205 (1976), wherein it was stated that "[b]ecause causation is a manipul-
able concept, there may be few effective checks on a court's discretion under [Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org.] to decline to adjudicate difficult cases." Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
See generally Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 663, 663-64 (1977), wherein the author concluded that "[tihe law of standing has thus
become a surrogate for decisions on the merits, providing an especially useful approach for
the Court when a decision on the merits overturns settled precedent."
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challenge by plaintiffs who alleged injuries remotely linked to the
activity at issue." The culmination of the expansive period was
perhaps signaled in 1970 by the Supreme Court decision in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp.4 5 There, the Court held that a plaintiff seeking to obtain
review of an administrative determination must allege that the
challenged action has caused him injury-in-fact," and, furthermore,
establish that the interest impinged upon is "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute. '4 7
" Illustrative of the developments which occurred as the Court expanded the standing
doctrine is the decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), wherein a taxpayer's standing
to challenge a federal spending measure was sustained for the first time. See id. at 106. In
subsequent cases, the interests which may serve as a predicate for standing were expanded
beyond the traditional economic one. Thus, allegations of injury to aesthetic, environmental,
or social interests now provide a basis for standing to challenge the source of the injury. See,
e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (environmental injury); Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (social injury).
45 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Data Processing Court repudiated the original administrative
standing test enunciated over thirty years earlier in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118 (1939). In Tennessee Electric, the Supreme Court held that a citizen "threatened
with direct and special injury by the act of an agent of the government which, but for
statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may challenge
the validity of the statute in a suit against the agent." Id. at 137 (emphasis added). The Court
stressed that legal rights, which it defined as those rights arising out of property or contract,
or protected against interference by the law of tort, conferred by statute as a privilege, must
be impinged before standing will be granted. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs' allegation of injury
arising from increased competition was damnum absque injuria, or damage resulting from
conduct which was not violative of a right recognized by law, and could not support standing
to sue the TVA. Id. at 140. But cf. Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968)
(allegation of competitive injury supported standing under a statutory provision enacted
primarily to protect private utility companies from TVA competition); accord, FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
In rejecting the legal interest test, the Data Processing majority stated that the test
necessarily resulted in a commingling of the merits with the standing issue. 397 U.S. at 153.
" 390 U.S. at 152.
,7 Id. at 153 (emphasis added). In Data Processing, the plaintiff, an association composed
of sellers of data processing services, challenged a ruling by the comptroller of the currency
permitting national banks to make data processing services available to their customers. The
Court granted standing, since the plaintiff had alleged that the ruling would cause its mem-
bers competitive injury, and the members were within the zone-of-interest protected by § 4
of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1976), which prohibits banks from
engaging in non-banking services. See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971);
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam). Concurring in the result but
dissenting with respect to the majority's treatment of standing in Data Processing, Justices
Brennan and White maintained that standing should be determined under the injury-in-fact
standard, which, they contended, is sufficient to satisfy the case and controversy require-
ment. 397 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Davis has long advocated the
injury-in-fact test as the only means by which the complexities of standing can be effectively
handled. See DAvis, supra note 6, at 515-16.
It should be noted that commentators have questioned the viability of the "zone-of-
interest" aspect of the Data Processing test, as the Supreme Court rarely invokes it. See, e.g.,
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The advent of the Data Processing standard led several com-
mentators to conclude that the doctrine of standing would no longer
operate as a significant barrier to the litigation of issues arising from
allegedly unauthorized agency activity. 8 Beginning in 1973, how-
ever, the Supreme Court, restrictively construing the Data
Processing test, denied standing to plaintiffs who could not estab-
lish a sufficiently direct relationship between the injury alleged and
the agency action at issue,49 or show that the relief requested would
alleviate such injury. 0
Housing and urban development cases provide a valuable back-
drop for reviewing federal courts' struggle to apply these standards.
On the one hand, where the plaintiff is the party primarily and
immediately affected by certain agency action, the courts have not
DAvis, supra note 6, at 509-16; Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv.
450, 457-73 (1970); Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of
Standing, 69 MicH. L. REv. 540, 551-68 (1971). A possible explanation of the infrequent use
of the zone-of-interest test may be found in Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 589 (2d Cir. 1976)
(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). There, the Second Circuit noted that the test
is relatively insignificant in the ultimate determination of a plaintiffs standing if the plaintiff
is unable to demonstrate that he suffered injury-in-fact. Id. at 592. The courts of appeal seem
to apply the Data Processing test in a nonuniform manner. Some courts look only to the
injury-in-fact aspect of the test, see, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467
F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972), while other courts utilize both prongs of the standard,
see, e.g., Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1973);
Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1241-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973);
Constructores Civiles de CentroAmerica, S.A. (CONCICA) v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1188
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
48 See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970);
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YAE L.J. 1363 (1973);
Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911 (1972).
" See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (organization
promoting indigents' access to health services denied standing to challenge IRS ruling);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (residents of Rochester, New York, have no standing to
challenge zoning ordinances of nearby town); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (neither citizens nor taxpayers have standing to challenge reserve
membership of members of Congress); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)
(taxpayer denied standing to object to secrecy of CIA expenditures); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488 (1974) (no standing to enjoin judge's bond-setting and sentencing practices); Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (mother of an illegitimate child denied standing to
challenge Texas courts' nonenforcement of certain section of the penal code against fathers
of illegitimate children).
-' In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Supreme Court inaugurated the notion of
viewing a party's standing to challenge government action in terms of the efficacy of the re-
lief sought. The Warth Court stated that the plaintiff therein had failed to "allege specific,
concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Id. at 508 (emphasis in
original). This concept was subsequently applied by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of the possible ramifications of this test,
see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 205 (1976).
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hesitated to proceed to the merits. Thus, for example, members of
a displaced community, potential residents of an urban renewal
project, and persons participating in a model cities plan have been
granted standing to challenge HUD activity with respect to the
particular project involved.5' On the other hand, in situations such
as Hartford, where the plaintiff is not directly affected by the
agency action, the courts have conducted a more extensive inquiry
in order to determine whether the alleged injury is "fairly traceable
to the defendant's acts or omissions. ' 52 In making this determina-
tion, federal courts have focused on the relationship between the
relief sought and the injury alleged. If the requested relief would
operate to alleviate the injury, the necessary causal relationship has
been deemed to exist and standing has been granted.
This test has been applied liberally by some lower federal
courts to confer standing on plaintiffs who might benefit from a
reallocation of funds resulting from a favorable finding on the merits
of their claims . 3 Opting for a somewhat stricter standard, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit recently found that a nationwide organiza-
tion of community health centers had standing to challenge the
propriety of a HEW remedial plan, because it was probable that the
relief requested would increase the funding available to the plain-
5, See, e.g., North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 963 (1972) (citizens group statutorily entitled to participate in model
cities plan may challenge HUD's unilateral changes to such plan); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d
809 (3d Cir. 1970) (residents and businessmen may challenge agency modification of proposed
urban renewal project to be constructed in their neighborhood); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (persons displaced by urban renewal project have
immediate and personal interest in outcome of suit); National Tenants Org., Inc. v. HUD,
358 F. Supp. 312 (D.D.C. 1973) (public housing tenants have standing to challenge HUD's
rent regulations); Findrilakis v. HUD, 357 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (applicants may
challenge HUD's determination of eligibility for tenancy in housing project); Hicks v.
Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) (potential tenant of proposed low-rent housing
project may challenge selection of construction site); Western Addition Comm. Org. v.
Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (persons displaced by urban renewal project may
enforce HUD compliance with statute requiring formulation of relocation plan); Powelton
Civic Home Owners Assoc. v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (persons to be displaced
by urban renewal project may challenge adequacy of relocation facilities). See also Rodeway
Inns of America, Inc. v. Frank, 541 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977)
(hotel owners have standing to sue owners of apartment building being converted into hotel
for violations of National Housing Act); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (New York City welfare organization and recipients have
standing to challenge HEW approval of two experimental work project programs).
52 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977).
53 See, e.g., Clark v. Richardson, 431 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412
F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition, Inc. v. Testerman,
404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
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tiff.54 Other courts have applied the test in an even more restrictive
-manner and have denied standing to plaintiffs who could not dem-
onstrate that the relief sought would alleviate the claimed injury."
In denying standing to the plaintiff in Hartford, the Second
Circuit appears to have aligned itself with those courts that have
applied the causal nexus test restrictively. It is submitted that this
strict approach to the causation requirement will often preclude
judicial review of agency action. For example, the statute allegedly
violated in Hartford, which benefits low-income city dwellers like
the individual Hartford plaintiffs, is implemented through the
agency's direct dealings with third parties, in this instance govern-
mental units. This approach to achieving legislative objectives nec-
essarily operates in an indirect manner. As a result, the beneficiary's
connection with the agency activity will appear tenuous when exam-
ined under a restrictive causation standard.
The Second Circuit in Hartford, therefore, has adopted a nar-
row approach to standing issues arising in suits challenging federal
agency activity." In so doing, the court seems to have insulated
", National Ass'n of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). See also Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Embry, 438 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa.
1977), wherein the plaintiff sought to enjoin the city of Philadelphia's expenditure of funds
received under Title I of the 1974 Act, contending that the recipient city was required to
allocate the funds for the benefit of low- and moderate-income families in proportion to the
relative number of such individuals in the city's population. Distinguishing Hartford on the
ground that, in Hartford, there was no guarantee that the plaintiffs would be benefited were
their action to succeed, the district court in Embry upheld plaintiff's standing, stating that
the reallocation of funds requested "will directly result in an increase in the availability of
housing units for low-income people." Id. at 438.
See Starbuck v. City and County of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1976)
(taxpayers and consumers of electricity have no standing to challenge activity of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, since they could not show that rates would decrease if they were success-
ful); Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976) (farmers have no standing to challenge
operation of state irrigation project). In Bowker, the court held that the plaintiff "may not
rely on 'the remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situation
might . . . improve were the court to afford relief.'" Id. at 1349 (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975)).
"' The Second Circuit adopted a similarly restrictive approach to the standing issue in
Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). The
plaintiffs in Evans, low-income minority residents of the New Castle, New York area, chal-
lenged a decision by HUD and the Department of Interior to grant funds to the town for the
construction of sewers and parks. They argued that the grants in effect supported the town's
primarily white, middle-class, single-family housing pattern and thereby violated the federal
government's affirmative duty under the civil rights legislation to curtail discrimination in
housing. Id. at 589. A majority of the Second Circuit panel initially upheld the plaintiffs'
standing, finding that the asserted interest was within the zone of interests protected by the
Civil Rights Acts. Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1975). See The Second Circuit
Note, 1974 Term, 50 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 254, 303 (1975), for an in-depth discussion of the panel
decision in Evans. After reconsidering the standing question in light of Warth v. Seldin, 422
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certain agency activity from judicial scrutiny,-7 thereby impairing
the judiciary's role of ensuring the legitimacy of agency action.58 The
result in Hartford suggests that the standing requirement has been
construed too strictly and mechanically to facilitate just application
in all cases. Courts must, of dourse, continue to adhere to the mini-
mum constitutional case or controversy requirement, as well as the
judicially created policy considerations designed to avoid unneces-
sary interference with the legislative realm. 9 A loosening of the
causality standard, however, would appear to be called for in cases
U.S. 490 (1975), however, the en banc court reversed and Ield that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, because they had failed establish an actual injury. 537 F.2d at 595. Plaintiffs'
contention that, had the grants not been approved, the funds "could conceivably have gone
to some other, as yet totally imaginary project. . . which might have had the result of making
more housing available to [the plaintiffs]," id. at 595 (emphasis in original), was, according
to the en bane majority, purely conjectural and inadequate to support standing in light of
the case and controversy limitation of Article mH. Id.; cf. Jones v. Tully, 378 F. Supp. 286
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam sub noma. Jones v. Meade, 510 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1975),
wherein the district court found that neighborhood residents had standing under § 10 of the
APA, see note 8 supra, to challenge the proposed construction of a low- and moderate-
income housing project to be funded with HUD monies. The grant of standing was premised
on the theory that construction of the project would perpetuate racial concentration in viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act. 378 F. Supp. at 287 n.1. The Second Circuit affirmed without
addressing the standing issue. Judge Oakes, dissenting in Evans, noted the apparent incon-
sistency between Jones and the en bane majority's position in Evans. 537 F.2d at 604 (Oakes,
J., dissenting).
11 In his separate dissenting opinion in Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1975) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977), Chief Judge Kaufman encouraged a more liberal
use of the standing doctrine than that applied by the en bane majority:
[Jiudicial review is, today viewed as a legitimate means of ensuring that
agencies observe congressional mandates ...
Obviously, I do not suggest that we read the Art. m standing requiremeht out
of existence . . . . But I do counsel against wooden application of the Warth prec-
edent to an entirely different setting, and against extension of that holding to
cover a situation which. . . is sharply distinguishable. Such an expansive reading
of Warth unnecessarily . . . flies in the face of the recent trend favoring judicial
oversight of the burgeoning administrative bureaucracy.
Under the majority's decision, it is unlikely that there could ever be a plaintiff
who will be allowed access to the courts to challenge HUD's abdication of its
congressionally-imposed duty.
537 F.2d at 610-11 (Kaufman, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In Hartford, however,
the Chief Judge applied the restrictive efficacy-of-relief test in his concurring opinion. 561
F.2d at 1052 (Kaufman, C.J., concurring). See note 36 supra.
- See generally F. CooPER, ADMinSTRATIWE AGENCIES AND THE CouRTs 305-15 (1951);
JAFFE, supra note 6, at 320-27; Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine,
17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 921 (1972).
11 That the separation of powers doctrine is still an effective limitation to the exercise of
the federal judicial power is a proposition recently echoed by both the Supreme Court and
the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Evans v. Lynn,
537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 106 (1977).
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where, due to the statutory scheme, the necessity of demonstrating
a direct relationship between the claimed injury and the challenged
agency action places an insuperable burden on potential plaintiffs. 0
It is suggested that a more equitable approach than that currently
followed would require courts to mitigate the rigors of the impartial
direct causality standard when particular considerations warrant
application of a less inflexible test.
Clare J. Attura
See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Commenting upon the majority's interpretation of the Article HI requirement of
injury-in-fact, Justice Brennan stated: "Thus, any time Congress chooses to legislate in favor
of certain interests by setting up a scheme of incentives for third parties, judicial review of
administrative action that allegedly frustrates the congressionally intended objective will be
denied, because any complainant will be required to make an almost impossible showing."
Id. at 64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
